/
tls13con.c
4513 lines (3907 loc) · 146 KB
/
tls13con.c
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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* TLS 1.3 Protocol
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "stdarg.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "keyhi.h"
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "prerr.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secmod.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "sslerr.h"
#include "tls13hkdf.h"
#include "tls13con.h"
#include "tls13exthandle.h"
typedef enum {
TrafficKeyClearText = 0,
TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData = 1,
TrafficKeyHandshake = 2,
TrafficKeyApplicationData = 3
} TrafficKeyType;
typedef enum {
CipherSpecRead,
CipherSpecWrite,
} CipherSpecDirection;
static SECStatus tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, TrafficKeyType type,
CipherSpecDirection install,
PRBool deleteSecret);
static SECStatus tls13_AESGCM(
ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
PRBool doDecrypt,
unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout,
const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
const unsigned char *additionalData, int additionalDataLen);
static SECStatus tls13_ChaCha20Poly1305(
ssl3KeyMaterial *keys,
PRBool doDecrypt,
unsigned char *out, int *outlen, int maxout,
const unsigned char *in, int inlen,
const unsigned char *additionalData, int additionalDataLen);
static SECStatus tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss);
static void tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group);
static SECStatus tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss,
TLS13KeyShareEntry *peerShare);
static SECStatus tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss,
const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup);
static SECStatus tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b,
PRUint32 length);
static SECStatus tls13_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificate(
sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length);
static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b,
PRUint32 length);
static SECStatus
tls13_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey);
static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(
sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
SSL3Hashes *hashes);
static SECStatus tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss,
sslSessionID *sid);
static SECStatus
tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key,
const char *prefix,
const char *suffix,
const SSL3Hashes *hashes,
PK11SymKey **dest);
static SECStatus tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey);
static SECStatus tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(sslSocket *ss,
unsigned long prefixLength,
SSL3Hashes *hashes);
static SECStatus tls13_VerifyFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3HandshakeType message,
PK11SymKey *secret,
PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
const SSL3Hashes *hashes);
static SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss,
PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
const SSL3Hashes *hashes);
static SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss,
PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
const SSL3Hashes *hashes);
static SECStatus tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b,
PRUint32 length);
static SECStatus tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss,
SSL3Hashes *hashes);
static SECStatus tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinished(
sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey, const SSL3Hashes *hashes,
PRBool sending, PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
unsigned int maxOutputLen);
static SECStatus tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss);
static SECStatus tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss);
const char kHkdfLabelClient[] = "client";
const char kHkdfLabelServer[] = "server";
const char kHkdfLabelPskBinderKey[] = "resumption psk binder key";
const char kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret[] = "early traffic secret";
const char kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret[] = "early exporter master secret";
const char kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret[] = "handshake traffic secret";
const char kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret[] = "application traffic secret";
const char kHkdfLabelFinishedSecret[] = "finished";
const char kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret[] = "resumption master secret";
const char kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret[] = "exporter master secret";
const char kHkdfPurposeKey[] = "key";
const char kHkdfPurposeIv[] = "iv";
#define TRAFFIC_SECRET(ss, dir, name) ((ss->sec.isServer ^ \
(dir == CipherSpecWrite)) \
? ss->ssl3.hs.client##name \
: ss->ssl3.hs.server##name)
const SSL3ProtocolVersion kTlsRecordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
const SSL3ProtocolVersion kDtlsRecordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1;
/* Belt and suspenders in case we ever add a TLS 1.4. */
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED <=
SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
/* Use this instead of FATAL_ERROR when no alert shall be sent. */
#define LOG_ERROR(ss, prError) \
do { \
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)", \
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, prError, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__)); \
PORT_SetError(prError); \
} while (0)
/* Log an error and generate an alert because something is irreparably wrong. */
#define FATAL_ERROR(ss, prError, desc) \
do { \
LOG_ERROR(ss, prError); \
tls13_FatalError(ss, prError, desc); \
} while (0)
void
tls13_FatalError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode prError, SSL3AlertDescription desc)
{
PORT_Assert(desc != internal_error); /* These should never happen */
(void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc);
PORT_SetError(prError);
}
#ifdef TRACE
#define STATE_CASE(a) \
case a: \
return #a
static char *
tls13_HandshakeState(SSL3WaitState st)
{
switch (st) {
STATE_CASE(idle_handshake);
STATE_CASE(wait_client_hello);
STATE_CASE(wait_client_cert);
STATE_CASE(wait_client_key);
STATE_CASE(wait_cert_verify);
STATE_CASE(wait_change_cipher);
STATE_CASE(wait_finished);
STATE_CASE(wait_server_hello);
STATE_CASE(wait_certificate_status);
STATE_CASE(wait_server_cert);
STATE_CASE(wait_server_key);
STATE_CASE(wait_cert_request);
STATE_CASE(wait_hello_done);
STATE_CASE(wait_new_session_ticket);
STATE_CASE(wait_encrypted_extensions);
default:
break;
}
PORT_Assert(0);
return "unknown";
}
#endif
#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK 0x80
#define TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ws) (ws & ~TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK)
/* We don't mask idle_handshake because other parts of the code use it*/
#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws) (((ws == idle_handshake) || (ws == wait_server_hello)) ? ws : ws | TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK)
#define TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, err, ...) \
tls13_CheckHsState(ss, err, #err, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, \
__VA_ARGS__, \
wait_invalid)
void
tls13_SetHsState(sslSocket *ss, SSL3WaitState ws,
const char *func, const char *file, int line)
{
#ifdef TRACE
const char *new_state_name =
tls13_HandshakeState(ws);
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),
tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)),
new_state_name,
func, file, line));
#endif
ss->ssl3.hs.ws = TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws);
}
static PRBool
tls13_InHsStateV(sslSocket *ss, va_list ap)
{
SSL3WaitState ws;
while ((ws = va_arg(ap, SSL3WaitState)) != wait_invalid) {
if (TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws) == ss->ssl3.hs.ws) {
return PR_TRUE;
}
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
PRBool
tls13_InHsState(sslSocket *ss, ...)
{
PRBool found;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, ss);
found = tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap);
va_end(ap);
return found;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_CheckHsState(sslSocket *ss, int err, const char *error_name,
const char *func, const char *file, int line,
...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, line);
if (tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap)) {
va_end(ap);
return SECSuccess;
}
va_end(ap);
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
error_name,
tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)),
func, file, line));
tls13_FatalError(ss, err, unexpected_message);
return SECFailure;
}
SSLHashType
tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ssl3CipherSuite suite)
{
const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipherDef =
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite);
PORT_Assert(cipherDef);
if (!cipherDef) {
return ssl_hash_none;
}
return cipherDef->prf_hash;
}
SSLHashType
tls13_GetHash(const sslSocket *ss)
{
/* All TLS 1.3 cipher suites must have an explict PRF hash. */
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash != ssl_hash_none);
return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash;
}
unsigned int
tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(SSLHashType hash)
{
switch (hash) {
case ssl_hash_sha256:
return 32;
case ssl_hash_sha384:
return 48;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
}
return 32;
}
unsigned int
tls13_GetHashSize(const sslSocket *ss)
{
return tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(tls13_GetHash(ss));
}
static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
tls13_GetHkdfMechanismForHash(SSLHashType hash)
{
switch (hash) {
case ssl_hash_sha256:
return CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256;
case ssl_hash_sha384:
return CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
}
return CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256;
}
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(sslSocket *ss)
{
return tls13_GetHkdfMechanismForHash(tls13_GetHash(ss));
}
static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
tls13_GetHmacMechanism(sslSocket *ss)
{
switch (tls13_GetHash(ss)) {
case ssl_hash_sha256:
return CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
case ssl_hash_sha384:
return CKM_SHA384_HMAC;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
}
return CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
}
SECStatus
tls13_CreateKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef)
{
SECStatus rv;
sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL;
const ssl3DHParams *params;
PORT_Assert(groupDef);
switch (groupDef->keaType) {
case ssl_kea_ecdh:
rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, groupDef, &keyPair);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
break;
case ssl_kea_dh:
params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef);
PORT_Assert(params->name != ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom);
rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
break;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
return rv;
}
SECStatus
SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares(PRFileDesc *fd, unsigned int count)
{
sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd);
if (!ss) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->additionalShares = count;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Generate shares for ECDHE and FFDHE. This picks the first enabled group of
* the requisite type and creates a share for that.
*
* Called from ssl3_SendClientHello.
*/
SECStatus
tls13_SetupClientHello(sslSocket *ss)
{
unsigned int i;
SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics();
NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL;
sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
unsigned int numShares = 0;
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
/* Select the first enabled group.
* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): be smarter about offering the group
* that the other side negotiated if we are resuming. */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) {
SECStatus rv;
if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]) {
continue;
}
rv = tls13_CreateKeyShare(ss, ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (++numShares > ss->additionalShares) {
break;
}
}
if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Below here checks if we can do stateless resumption. */
if (sid->cached == never_cached ||
sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. */
session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
PORT_Assert(session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data);
if (ssl_TicketTimeValid(session_ticket)) {
ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE;
}
if (ss->statelessResume) {
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid);
rv = tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->sch_sid_cache_not_ok);
ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, PR_FALSE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
return SECFailure;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey,
PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length,
SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem publicValue = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
publicValue.data = b;
publicValue.len = length;
if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&pubKey->u.dh.prime, &publicValue)) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE);
return SECFailure;
}
peerKey->keyType = dhKey;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime,
&pubKey->u.dh.prime);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base,
&pubKey->u.dh.base);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue,
&publicValue);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_HandleKeyShare(sslSocket *ss,
TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry,
sslKeyPair *keyPair)
{
PORTCheapArenaPool arena;
SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
PRErrorCode errorCode;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(&arena.arena, SECKEYPublicKey);
if (peerKey == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
peerKey->arena = &arena.arena;
peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
switch (entry->group->keaType) {
case ssl_kea_ecdh:
rv = ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(ss, peerKey,
entry->key_exchange.data,
entry->key_exchange.len,
entry->group);
mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
break;
case ssl_kea_dh:
rv = tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(ss, peerKey,
entry->key_exchange.data,
entry->key_exchange.len,
keyPair->pubKey);
mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
break;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
goto loser;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(
keyPair->privKey, peerKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, mechanism,
tls13_GetHkdfMechanism(ss), CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE);
goto loser;
}
PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena);
errorCode = PORT_GetError(); /* don't overwrite the error code */
tls13_FatalError(ss, errorCode, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b,
PRUint32 length, SSL3Hashes *hashesPtr)
{
if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore != ssl_0rtt_ignore_none) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s successfully decrypted handshake after"
"failed 0-RTT",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none;
}
/* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Would it be better to check all the states here? */
switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) {
case certificate:
return tls13_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length);
case certificate_request:
return tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length);
case certificate_verify:
if (!hashesPtr) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY, unexpected_message);
return SECFailure;
}
return tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
case encrypted_extensions:
return tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(ss, b, length);
case new_session_ticket:
return tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length);
case finished:
if (!hashesPtr) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, unexpected_message);
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
return tls13_ServerHandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
} else {
return tls13_ClientHandleFinished(ss, b, length, hashesPtr);
}
default:
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE, unexpected_message);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(0); /* Unreached */
return SECFailure;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid)
{
PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */
SECItem wrappedMS = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SSLHashType hashType;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: recovering static secret (%s)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped) {
PORT_Assert(0); /* I think this can't happen. */
return SECFailure;
}
/* Now find the hash used as the PRF for the previous handshake. */
hashType = tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite);
/* If we are the server, we compute the wrapping key, but if we
* are the client, its coordinates are stored with the ticket. */
if (ss->sec.isServer) {
wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
ss->pkcs11PinArg);
} else {
PK11SlotInfo *slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID,
sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID);
if (!slot)
return SECFailure;
wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries,
ss->pkcs11PinArg);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
if (!wrapKey) {
return SECFailure;
}
wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret;
wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
/* unwrap the "master secret" which is actually RMS. */
ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(
wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech,
NULL, &wrappedMS,
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE,
CKA_DERIVE,
tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType),
CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY);
PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret) {
return SECFailure;
}
PRINT_KEY(50, (ss, "Recovered RMS", ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret));
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Key Derivation Functions.
*
* Below is the key schedule from [draft-ietf-tls-tls13].
*
* * The relevant functions from this file are indicated by tls13_Foo().
* 0
* |
* v
* PSK -> HKDF-Extract
* |
* v
* Early Secret ---> Derive-Secret(., "client early traffic secret",
* | ClientHello)
* | = client_early_traffic_secret
* v
* (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract
* |
* v
* Handshake Secret
* |
* +---------> Derive-Secret(., "client handshake traffic secret",
* | ClientHello...ServerHello)
* | = client_handshake_traffic_secret
* |
* +---------> Derive-Secret(., "server handshake traffic secret",
* | ClientHello...ServerHello)
* | = server_handshake_traffic_secret
* |
* v
* 0 -> HKDF-Extract
* |
* v
* Master Secret
* |
* +---------> Derive-Secret(., "client application traffic secret",
* | ClientHello...Server Finished)
* | = client_traffic_secret_0
* |
* +---------> Derive-Secret(., "server application traffic secret",
* | ClientHello...Server Finished)
* | = server_traffic_secret_0
* |
* +---------> Derive-Secret(., "exporter master secret",
* | ClientHello...Client Finished)
* | = exporter_secret
* |
* +---------> Derive-Secret(., "resumption master secret",
* ClientHello...Client Finished)
* = resumption_secret
*
*/
static SECStatus
tls13_ComputeEarlySecrets(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute early secrets (%s)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
/* Extract off the resumptionMasterSecret (if present), else pass the NULL
* resumptionMasterSecret which will be internally translated to zeroes. */
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL, ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret,
tls13_GetHash(ss), &ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume == (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret != NULL));
if (ss->statelessResume) {
PRUint8 buf[1] = { 0 };
SSL3Hashes hashes;
PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret);
ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL;
rv = PK11_HashBuf(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(tls13_GetHash(ss)),
hashes.u.raw, buf, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error);
return SECFailure;
}
hashes.len = tls13_GetHashSize(ss);
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
NULL, kHkdfLabelPskBinderKey, &hashes,
&ss->ssl3.hs.pskBinderKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
NULL, kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret,
&hashes, &ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
} else {
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret);
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
PK11SymKey *newSecret = NULL;
SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secrets (%s)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
/* First update |currentSecret| to add |dheSecret|, if any. */
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret);
rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret,
tls13_GetHash(ss), &newSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret);
ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL;
PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret;
/* Now compute |*HsTrafficSecret| */
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
kHkdfLabelClient,
kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, NULL,
&ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
kHkdfLabelServer,
kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, NULL,
&ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute master secret (%s)",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
/* Crank HKDF forward to make master secret, which we
* stuff in current secret. */
rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
NULL,
tls13_GetHash(ss),
&newSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
kHkdfLabelClient,
kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret,
NULL,
&ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
kHkdfLabelServer,
kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret,
NULL,
&ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
NULL, kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret,
NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss)
{
SECStatus rv;
PK11SymKey *resumptionMasterSecret = NULL;
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.crSpec->master_secret);
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret);
rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret,
NULL, kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret,
NULL, &resumptionMasterSecret);
PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret);
ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL;
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* This is pretty gross. TLS 1.3 uses a number of master secrets:
* The master secret to generate the keys and then the resumption
* master secret for future connections. To make this work without
* refactoring too much of the SSLv3 code, we store the RMS in
* |crSpec->master_secret| and |cwSpec->master_secret|.
*/
ss->ssl3.crSpec->master_secret = resumptionMasterSecret;
ss->ssl3.cwSpec->master_secret =
PK11_ReferenceSymKey(ss->ssl3.crSpec->master_secret);
return SECSuccess;
}
static void
tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid)
{
/* Set these to match the cached value.
* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Make a version with the "true" values.
* Bug 1256137.
*/
ss->sec.authType = sid->authType;
ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits;
}
/* Check whether resumption-PSK is allowed. */
static PRBool
tls13_CanResume(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid)
{
const sslServerCert *sc;
if (!sid) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (sid->version != ss->version) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) != tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
/* Server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, but they
* do remember the type of certificate we originally used, so we can locate
* it again, provided that the current ssl socket has had its server certs
* configured the same as the previous one. */
sc = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, sid->namedCurve);
if (!sc || !sc->serverCert) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
return PR_TRUE;
}
static PRBool
tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid)
{
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent);
if (!sid)
return PR_FALSE;
PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume);
if (!ss->statelessResume)
return PR_FALSE;
if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)
return PR_FALSE;
if (!ss->opt.enable0RttData)
return PR_FALSE;
if (!(sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data))
return PR_FALSE;
if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&ss->xtnData.nextProto,
&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection) != 0)
return PR_FALSE;
return PR_TRUE;
}
/* Called from tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 to update the state of 0-RTT handling.
*
* 0-RTT is only permitted if:
* 1. The early data extension was present.
* 2. We are resuming a session.
* 3. The 0-RTT option is set.
* 4. The ticket allowed 0-RTT.
* 5. We negotiated the same ALPN value as in the ticket.
*/
static void
tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid)
{
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: negotiate 0-RTT %p",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sid));
/* tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn sets this to ssl_0rtt_sent, so this will
* be ssl_0rtt_none unless early_data is present. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none) {
return;
}
/* If we rejected 0-RTT on the first ClientHello, then we can just say that
* there is no 0-RTT for the second. We shouldn't get any more. Reset the
* ignore state so that we treat decryption failure normally. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr) {
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry);
ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none;
ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none;
return;
}
if (!tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(ss, sid)) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore 0-RTT",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));