/
ssl3exthandle.c
2006 lines (1744 loc) · 65.6 KB
/
ssl3exthandle.c
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nssrenam.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "blapit.h"
#include "prinit.h"
#include "selfencrypt.h"
#include "ssl3ext.h"
#include "ssl3exthandle.h"
#include "tls13exthandle.h" /* For tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn. */
/* Format an SNI extension, using the name from the socket's URL,
* unless that name is a dotted decimal string.
* Used by client and server.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientSendServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
unsigned int len;
PRNetAddr netAddr;
SECStatus rv;
/* must have a hostname */
if (!ss->url || !ss->url[0]) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* must not be an IPv4 or IPv6 address */
if (PR_SUCCESS == PR_StringToNetAddr(ss->url, &netAddr)) {
/* is an IP address (v4 or v6) */
return SECSuccess;
}
len = PORT_Strlen(ss->url);
/* length of server_name_list */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, len + 3, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* HostName (length and value) */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (const PRUint8 *)ss->url, len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Handle an incoming SNI extension. */
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECItem *names = NULL;
PRUint32 listLenBytes = 0;
SECStatus rv;
if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
return SECSuccess; /* ignore extension */
}
/* Server side - consume client data and register server sender. */
/* do not parse the data if don't have user extension handling function. */
if (!ss->sniSocketConfig) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* length of server_name_list */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &listLenBytes, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* alert already sent */
}
if (listLenBytes == 0 || listLenBytes != data->len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Read ServerNameList. */
while (data->len > 0) {
SECItem tmp;
PRUint32 type;
/* Read Name Type. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &type, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* alert sent in ConsumeHandshakeNumber */
goto loser;
}
/* Read ServerName (length and value). */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &tmp, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* Record the value for host_name(0). */
if (type == sni_nametype_hostname) {
/* Fail if we encounter a second host_name entry. */
if (names) {
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Create an array for the only supported NameType. */
names = PORT_ZNewArray(SECItem, 1);
if (!names) {
goto loser;
}
/* Copy ServerName into the array. */
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &names[0], &tmp) != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
/* Even if we don't support NameTypes other than host_name at the
* moment, we continue parsing the whole list to check its validity.
* We do not check for duplicate entries with NameType != host_name(0).
*/
}
if (names) {
/* Free old and set the new data. */
ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(xtnData);
xtnData->sniNameArr = names;
xtnData->sniNameArrSize = 1;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_server_name_xtn;
}
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
loser:
if (names) {
PORT_Free(names);
}
return SECFailure;
}
/* Frees a given xtnData->sniNameArr and its elements. */
void
ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(TLSExtensionData *xtnData)
{
PRUint32 i;
if (!xtnData->sniNameArr) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < xtnData->sniNameArrSize; i++) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->sniNameArr[i], PR_FALSE);
}
PORT_Free(xtnData->sniNameArr);
xtnData->sniNameArr = NULL;
xtnData->sniNameArrSize = 0;
}
/* Called by both clients and servers.
* Clients sends a filled in session ticket if one is available, and otherwise
* sends an empty ticket. Servers always send empty tickets.
*/
PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL;
sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
/* Never send an extension with a ticket for TLS 1.3, but
* OK to send the empty one in case the server does 1.2. */
if (sid->cached == in_client_cache &&
sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */
if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Send a session ticket if one is available.
*
* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. We cannot
* just acquire and release the lock within this function because the
* caller will call this function twice, and we need the inputs to be
* consistent between the two calls. Note that currently the caller
* will only be holding the lock when we are the client and when we're
* attempting to resume an existing session.
*/
session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
if (session_ticket->ticket.data &&
(xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified ||
ssl_TicketTimeValid(session_ticket))) {
xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, session_ticket->ticket.data,
session_ticket->ticket.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
PRBool
ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(const sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *tag)
{
const unsigned char *data = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data;
unsigned int length = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;
unsigned int offset = 0;
if (!tag->len)
return PR_TRUE;
while (offset < length) {
unsigned int taglen = (unsigned int)data[offset];
if ((taglen == tag->len) &&
!PORT_Memcmp(data + offset + 1, tag->data, tag->len))
return PR_TRUE;
offset += 1 + taglen;
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
/* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) {
/* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn;
/* TODO: server side NPN support would require calling
* ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender here in order to echo the
* extension back to the client. */
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego checks that the given block of data is valid: none
* of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of
* the block. */
SECStatus
ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int length)
{
unsigned int offset = 0;
while (offset < length) {
unsigned int newOffset = offset + 1 + (unsigned int)data[offset];
/* Reject embedded nulls to protect against buggy applications that
* store protocol identifiers in null-terminated strings.
*/
if (newOffset > length || data[offset] == 0) {
return SECFailure;
}
offset = newOffset;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* protocol selection handler for ALPN (server side) and NPN (client side) */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
PRUint16 extension, SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
unsigned char resultBuffer[255];
SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 };
rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return rv;
}
PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback);
/* For ALPN, the cipher suite isn't selected yet. Note that extensions
* sometimes affect what cipher suite is selected, e.g., for ECC. */
PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo &
ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite) ==
(ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite));
rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len,
result.data, &result.len, sizeof(resultBuffer));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* Expect callback to call PORT_SetError() */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
return SECFailure;
}
/* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our
* stack. */
if (result.len > sizeof(resultBuffer)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
/* TODO: crash */
return SECFailure;
}
SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE);
if (extension == ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn &&
xtnData->nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) {
/* The callback might say OK, but then it picks a default value - one
* that was not listed. That's OK for NPN, but not ALPN. */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, no_application_protocol);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = extension;
return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->nextProto, &result);
}
/* handle an incoming ALPN extension at the server */
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PRUint32 count;
SECStatus rv;
/* We expressly don't want to allow ALPN on renegotiation,
* despite it being permitted by the spec. */
if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len == 0) {
/* Clients MUST send a non-empty ALPN extension. */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Unlike NPN, ALPN has extra redundant length information so that
* the extension is the same in both ClientHello and ServerHello. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &count, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess || count != data->len) {
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
/* we're not configured for it */
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, xtnData, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
/* prepare to send back a response, if we negotiated */
if (xtnData->nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) {
rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData,
ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn,
ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return rv;
}
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) {
/* If the server negotiated ALPN then it has already told us what
* protocol to use, so it doesn't make sense for us to try to negotiate
* a different one by sending the NPN handshake message. However, if
* we've negotiated NPN then we're required to send the NPN handshake
* message. Thus, these two extensions cannot both be negotiated on the
* same connection. */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER);
return SECFailure;
}
/* We should only get this call if we sent the extension, so
* ss->nextProtoCallback needs to be non-NULL. However, it is possible
* that an application erroneously cleared the callback between the time
* we sent the ClientHello and now. */
if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
PORT_Assert(0);
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_CALLBACK);
return SECFailure;
}
return ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, xtnData, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, data);
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 list_len;
SECItem protocol_name;
if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* The extension data from the server has the following format:
* uint16 name_list_len;
* uint8 len; // where len >= 1
* uint8 protocol_name[len]; */
if (data->len < 4 || data->len > 2 + 1 + 255) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &list_len, 2, &data->data,
&data->len);
/* The list has to be the entire extension. */
if (rv != SECSuccess || list_len != data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &protocol_name, 1,
&data->data, &data->len);
/* The list must have exactly one value. */
if (rv != SECSuccess || data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(ss, &protocol_name)) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
return SECFailure;
}
SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE);
xtnData->nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn;
return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->nextProto, &protocol_name);
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
/* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
if (!ss->opt.enableNPN || !ss->nextProtoCallback || ss->firstHsDone) {
return SECSuccess;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
const unsigned int len = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;
/* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
if (!ss->opt.enableALPN || !ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data || ss->firstHsDone) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* NPN requires that the client's fallback protocol is first in the
* list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So move the
* first protocol to the end of the list. */
if (len > 0) {
/* Each protocol string is prefixed with a single byte length. */
unsigned int i;
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
i = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[0] + 1;
if (i <= len) {
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[i], len - i);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, i);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
} else {
/* This seems to be invalid data so we'll send as-is. */
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* We're in over our heads if any of these fail */
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.enableALPN);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProto.data);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProto.len > 0);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED);
PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->nextProto.len + 1, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, xtnData->nextProto.data,
xtnData->nextProto.len, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
sslExtensionBuilderFunc sender;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
/* remember that we got this extension. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn;
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
sender = tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn;
} else {
sender = ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn;
}
return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ssl_cert_status_xtn, sender);
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
if (!serverCert->certStatusArray ||
!serverCert->certStatusArray->len) {
return SECSuccess;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn builds the status_request extension on the
* client side. See RFC 6066 section 8. */
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (!ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling) {
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 1 /* status_type ocsp */, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* A zero length responder_id_list means that the responders are
* implicitly known to the server. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* A zero length request_extensions means that there are no extensions.
* Specifically, we don't set the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension. This
* means that the server can replay a cached OCSP response to us. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
/* In TLS 1.3, the extension carries the OCSP response. */
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
SECStatus rv;
rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss),
data->data, data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* code already set */
}
} else if (data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
PRUint32 ssl_ticket_lifetime = 2 * 24 * 60 * 60; /* 2 days in seconds */
#define TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION (0x0106)
/*
* Called from ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket, tls13_SendNewSessionTicket
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, const NewSessionTicket *ticket,
const PRUint8 *appToken, unsigned int appTokenLen,
PK11SymKey *secret, SECItem *ticket_data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SECItem plaintext;
SECItem plaintext_item = { 0, NULL, 0 };
PRUint32 plaintext_length;
SECItem ticket_buf = { 0, NULL, 0 };
PRBool ms_is_wrapped;
unsigned char wrapped_ms[SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH];
SECItem ms_item = { 0, NULL, 0 };
PRUint32 cert_length = 0;
PRTime now;
SECItem *srvName = NULL;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE msWrapMech = 0; /* dummy default value,
* must be >= 0 */
SECItem *alpnSelection = NULL;
PRUint32 ticketAgeBaseline;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send session_ticket handshake",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));
if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) {
cert_length = 2 + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len;
}
if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data) {
PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
/* The master secret is available unwrapped. */
ms_item.data = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data;
ms_item.len = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len;
ms_is_wrapped = PR_FALSE;
} else {
/* Extract the master secret wrapped. */
sslSessionID sid;
PORT_Memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sslSessionID));
PORT_Assert(secret);
rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(ss, &sid, secret);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
if (sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len > sizeof(wrapped_ms))
goto loser;
memcpy(wrapped_ms, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len);
ms_item.data = wrapped_ms;
ms_item.len = sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
msWrapMech = sid.u.ssl3.masterWrapMech;
} else {
/* TODO: else send an empty ticket. */
goto loser;
}
ms_is_wrapped = PR_TRUE;
}
/* Prep to send negotiated name */
srvName = &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.srvName;
PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED ||
ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED ||
ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0);
alpnSelection = &ss->xtnData.nextProto;
plaintext_length =
sizeof(PRUint16) /* ticket version */
+ sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) /* ssl_version */
+ sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) /* ciphersuite */
+ 1 /* compression */
+ 10 /* cipher spec parameters */
+ 1 /* certType arguments */
+ 1 /* SessionTicket.ms_is_wrapped */
+ 4 /* msWrapMech */
+ 2 /* master_secret.length */
+ ms_item.len /* master_secret */
+ 1 /* client_auth_type */
+ cert_length /* cert */
+ 2 + srvName->len /* name len + length field */
+ 1 /* extendedMasterSecretUsed */
+ sizeof(now) /* ticket lifetime hint */
+ sizeof(ticket->flags) /* ticket flags */
+ 1 + alpnSelection->len /* alpn value + length field */
+ 4 /* maxEarlyData */
+ 4 /* ticketAgeBaseline */
+ 2 + appTokenLen; /* application token */
/* This really only happens if appTokenLen is too much, and that always
* comes from the using application. */
if (plaintext_length > 0xffff) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
goto loser;
}
if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &plaintext_item, plaintext_length) == NULL)
goto loser;
plaintext = plaintext_item;
/* ticket version */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION,
sizeof(PRUint16));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* ssl_version */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->version,
sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* ciphersuite */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite,
sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* compression */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* cipher spec parameters */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authType, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authKeyBits, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaType, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaKeyBits, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* certificate type */
PORT_Assert(SSL_CERT_IS(ss->sec.serverCert, ss->sec.authType));
if (SSL_CERT_IS_EC(ss->sec.serverCert)) {
const sslServerCert *cert = ss->sec.serverCert;
PORT_Assert(cert->namedCurve);
/* EC curves only use the second of the two bytes. */
PORT_Assert(cert->namedCurve->name < 256);
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, cert->namedCurve->name, 1);
} else {
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* master_secret */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_is_wrapped, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, msWrapMech, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.data, ms_item.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* client identity */
if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) {
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext,
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext,
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.data,
ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
} else {
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
/* timestamp */
now = ssl_TimeUsec();
PORT_Assert(sizeof(now) == 8);
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, now, 8);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* HostName (length and value) */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (srvName->len) {
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, srvName->data, srvName->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
/* extendedMasterSecretUsed */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(
&plaintext, ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Flags */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ticket->flags,
sizeof(ticket->flags));
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* ALPN value. */
PORT_Assert(alpnSelection->len < 256);
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, alpnSelection->len, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (alpnSelection->len) {
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, alpnSelection->data,
alpnSelection->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ssl_max_early_data_size, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/*
* We store this in the ticket:
* ticket_age_baseline = 1rtt - ticket_age_add
*
* When the client resumes, it will provide:
* obfuscated_age = ticket_age_client + ticket_age_add
*
* We expect to receive the ticket at:
* ticket_create + 1rtt + ticket_age_server
*
* We calculate the client's estimate of this as:
* ticket_create + ticket_age_baseline + obfuscated_age
* = ticket_create + 1rtt + ticket_age_client
*
* This is compared to the expected time, which should differ only as a
* result of clock errors or errors in the RTT estimate.
*/
ticketAgeBaseline = (ssl_TimeUsec() - ss->ssl3.hs.serverHelloTime) / PR_USEC_PER_MSEC;
ticketAgeBaseline -= ticket->ticket_age_add;
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ticketAgeBaseline, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Application token */
rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, appTokenLen, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, appToken, appTokenLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Check that we are totally full. */
PORT_Assert(plaintext.len == 0);
/* 128 just gives us enough room for overhead. */
if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ticket_buf, plaintext_length + 128) == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
/* Finally, encrypt the ticket. */
rv = ssl_SelfEncryptProtect(ss, plaintext_item.data, plaintext_item.len,
ticket_buf.data, &ticket_buf.len, ticket_buf.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* Give ownership of memory to caller. */
*ticket_data = ticket_buf;
SECITEM_FreeItem(&plaintext_item, PR_FALSE);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
if (plaintext_item.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&plaintext_item, PR_FALSE);
}
if (ticket_buf.data) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket_buf, PR_FALSE);
}
return SECFailure;
}
/* When a client receives a SessionTicket extension a NewSessionTicket
* message is expected during the handshake.
*/
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
if (data->len != 0) {
return SECSuccess; /* Ignore the extension. */
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_session_ticket_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
ssl_ParseSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *decryptedTicket,
SessionTicket *parsedTicket)
{
PRUint32 temp;
SECStatus rv;
PRUint8 *buffer = decryptedTicket->data;
unsigned int len = decryptedTicket->len;
PORT_Memset(parsedTicket, 0, sizeof(*parsedTicket));
parsedTicket->valid = PR_FALSE;
/* If the decrypted ticket is empty, then report success, but leave the
* ticket marked as invalid. */
if (decryptedTicket->len == 0) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Read ticket version. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Skip the ticket if the version is wrong. This won't result in a